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Abstract 
 
CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements are prevalent among S&P1500 
firms. While prior research has examined their impact on corporate decision from shareholders’ 
perspective, there is little research on their impact from debtholders’ perspective. We examine 
the effect on debt contracting of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment 
agreements and severance pay agreements. We find that compared with other loans, loans issued 
by firms with CEO contractual protection contain more financial covenants, particularly 
performance covenants, are more likely to have performance pricing provisions, and have higher 
loan spreads. We further find that this effect increases with the monetary strength of CEO 
contractual protection and CEOs’ appetite and opportunities for risk-taking. Collectively these 
results shed light on the impact of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting.  
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1. Introduction 
CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements are widely used by 
companies. As of 2008, over 80% of S&P 1500 firms have such agreements with their CEOs. An 
important purpose of using such agreements is to align CEOs’ interests with shareholders’ and 
motivate them to undertake risky projects because these agreements protect them from downside 
risk. Consistent with this purpose, recent studies have provided evidence that firms use CEO 
contractual agreements to motivate CEOs to undertake risky projects and that the existence of 
CEO contractual agreements is positively associated with firms’ investments and risk (e.g., 
Huang 2011; Xu 2011; Rau and Xu 2013; Cziraki and Groen-Xu 2015; Cadman et al. 2016).  
CEOs’ incentives to invest in risky projects have important implications for debt 
contracting. Risky projects can lead to a deterioration of credit quality and adversely affect 
debtholders’ payoffs. As a result, when lending to firms with CEO employment agreements or 
severance pay agreements, referred to as CEO contractual protection, debtholders have 
incentives to monitor the firms more closely to ensure that the firms can pay interest and 
principal in due course, and potentially charge a higher interest rate. In this study, we focus on 
these debt-contracting consequences of CEO contracts; evidence of higher monitoring and 
borrowing cost highlights a significant cost of CEO contracts, which so far has been overlooked 
by prior research. 
Following Chen et al. (2015), in this paper we focus on two types of CEO contractual 
protection: CEO employment agreements and standalone ex-ante severance pay agreements. As 
discussed in detail later, CEO employment agreements are fixed-term comprehensive contracts 
between CEOs and firms. They typically specify the termination payments and other terms such 
as non-competition and confidentiality. CEOs with employment agreements cannot be fired 
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within the term without good cause. Unlike employment agreements, standalone severance pay 
agreements do not have a fixed term. They stipulate the amount and terms of payments that 
CEOs can receive when their employment is terminated. These agreements are the outcomes of 
the negotiation between the firm and the CEO.1 From the shareholders’ perspective, such 
agreements increase the cost of firing the CEO, therefore enhancing CEOs’ job security. 
However, they benefit the firm by motivating the CEO to undertake long-term risky projects. 
From the CEOs’ perspective, such agreements offer protection by compensating them for 
termination and downside risk (Rusticus 2006; Xu 2013).  
CEO contracts protect CEOs from downside risk and short-term performance swings (e.g., 
Rau and Xu 2013). As a result, CEOs with contractual protection are more likely to invest in 
risky projects than those without. Anticipating this, debtholders will resort to various 
mechanisms to monitor managerial actions and protect themselves. We focus on private debt in 
the main analyses since public debtholders often delegate monitoring to private lenders (e.g., 
Beatty, Liao, and Weber 2012). Prior research argues that financial covenants can help 
debtholders to monitor management by reducing managers’ discretion and by defining the 
circumstances under which debtholders can intervene (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979; Aghion and 
Bolton 1992). Performance-pricing provisions, by linking borrowing costs to firm performance, 
play a similar role. Hence, we predict that compared with other firms, firms with CEO 
contractual protection will have more financial covenants and are more likely to have 
performance pricing provisions in their loan contracts. If the use of additional covenants and 
provisions cannot fully address the potentially greater downside risk of investments, lenders will 
require a higher rate of return and hence firms with CEO contractual protection are expected to 
                                                 
1 Whether the CEO can obtain such agreements and the terms of the agreements depend on the uncertainty of the 
business environment, the likelihood of the CEO being replaced, and the CEO’s ability, among other things. See 
Section 2.1 for more detailed discussions.  
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have higher loan spreads than the other firms. 
Besides the above risk-taking argument, CEO contractual protection can affect the use of 
financial covenants and performance pricing provisions through another channel. Whether firms 
use these covenants depends on the quality of accounting information. When accounting 
information quality is higher, firms are more likely to use financial covenants and performance 
pricing provisions to address debtholder-shareholder agency problems, and vice versa. Because 
prior research finds that firms with CEO contractual protection have weaker incentives to engage 
in earnings management (Chen et al.2015), these firms likely have higher accounting information 
quality and are thus more likely to rely on financial covenants and performance pricing 
provisions. However, this argument implies the opposite prediction for loan spread. Under this 
argument, the debtholder-shareholder agency conflict does not change with the use of CEO 
contractual protection, and a greater use of financial covenants and performance pricing 
provisions reduces the agency conflict and in turn loan spread. Thus, the results based on loan 
spread can shed light on which argument – the risk-taking argument or the accounting 
information quality argument – is more applicable in this setting. 
We test our predictions using 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms with required data 
over the period 1995-2008. We hand collect information on CEO employment agreements and 
severance pay agreements from proxy statements. Given that the existence of CEO contractual 
protection varies with firm and CEO characteristics (e.g., Gillan et al. 2009; Rau and Xu 2013), 
we control for the endogeneity of CEO contractual protection using both the instrumental 
variable approach and the Heckman approach (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004). We find that, consistent 
with our prediction, firms with CEO contractual protection include more financial covenants, are 
more likely to have performance pricing provisions in their loans, and have higher loan spreads 
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than those without such protection. These results hold before and after controlling for the 
determinants of debt contracting as shown in prior research, CEO compensation structure and 
ownership, loan type and purpose fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. The effect of CEO 
contractual protection is also economically significant. Compared with loans issued by other 
firms, those issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have 6.7 percent more financial 
covenants, are 11.4 percent more likely to include performance pricing provisions, and have 8.1 
percent higher yield. These results are consistent with the argument that the use of CEO 
contractual protection induces CEOs to be more risk-taking and debtholders are more likely to 
use financial covenants and performance pricing provisions to protect their interest and charge a 
higher loan spread. The results based on loan spread suggest that the accounting information 
quality argument is not dominant in this setting.  
There are two types of financial covenants, performance covenants and capital covenants. 
Performance covenants are based on current performance metrics, which are timely and forward-
looking indicators of negative trends in credit quality. In contrast, capital covenants rely on 
cumulated profitability and protect debtholders’ interest by limiting the amount of debt the firm 
can have. As such, unlike performance covenants, capital covenants are less useful in facilitating 
lenders’ monitoring of firms’ risky investments (Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). As a result, we 
expect that loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have more performance 
covenants, but we do not expect that firms with and without CEO contractual protection differ in 
the number of capital covenants. Our results are consistent with these two predictions. This test 
helps sharpen our inferences and sheds light on the mechanism that debtholders use to protect 
their welfare in the presence of CEO contractual protection.2 
                                                 
2 This test also helps us further address the possibility that our results may be driven by high risk firms self-selecting 
into having CEO contractual protection, not by CEO contracts that create concerns for debtholders. Under this 
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CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements vary in the monetary strength. 
When the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection is stronger, its effect on CEOs’ risk-
taking behavior is also more pronounced. Thus we predict that the effect of CEO contractual 
protection on debt contracting increases with its monetary strength. We find results consistent 
with this prediction.  
The main argument underlying our predictions is that CEO contractual protection changes 
CEOs’ risk-taking behavior. Hence, the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting 
should vary systematically with CEOs’ appetite for risk-taking and with their opportunities to 
undertake risky projects. Based on prior research, we argue that CEOs are less likely to 
undertake risky projects when they are older (Dechow and Sloan 1991; Cheng 2004) or when 
they have longer tenure (e.g., Berger, Ofek and Yermack 1997). As such, we expect that the 
effect of CEO contractual protection is weaker for older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenures. In 
addition, prior research finds that firms in the growth stage have more growth opportunities than 
other firms (e.g., Hribar and Yehuda 2015). It thus follows that the effect of CEO contractual 
protection is stronger for firms in the growth stage. The empirical analyses are consistent with 
these predictions. We find that as expected, the effect of CEO protection on debt contracting is 
weaker when CEOs have a lower appetite for risk-taking (older CEOs and longer-tenured CEOs) 
and is stronger when CEOs have more opportunities for risk-taking (i.e., firms in the growth 
stage of life-cycle).  
Lastly, we conduct a series of additional tests to reinforce our inferences and to provide 
additional insights. First, we extend our analyses to public bond yield spread. We focus on bond 
yield spread because bondholders lack the monitoring incentives and renegotiation flexibility, 
                                                                                                                                                             
alternative explanation, loans issued by firms with CEO protection should also contain more capital covenants, but 
we do not observe this result.  
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and prefer to protect themselves via price terms (e.g., Bharath et al. 2008). Consistent with the 
finding for private debt, we find that firms with CEO contractual protection have higher bond 
yield spread than other firms. This result validates our inferences using private debt. Second, 
while some firms consistently use or do not use CEO protection throughout the sample period 
(non-switch firms), other firms switch back and forth. To ensure that non-switch firms do not 
drive our results, we examine whether our results hold for the switch firms. The results are 
qualitatively similar. In addition, when we use the difference-in-differences research design for 
the switch firms and non-switch firms, our inferences continue to hold. Third, our results also 
hold after we control for additional governance variables such as board independence, E-index, 
and a founder CEO indicator, and CEO inside debt based on the subsample for which the data 
are available. Lastly, in the main analyses, we combine employment agreements and severance 
pay agreements together. When we separately examine the effect of these two types of 
agreements, we find that the results hold for both types.  
Our paper makes several important contributions. First, we contribute to the emerging 
literature on CEO employment contracts. So far, this literature mainly focuses on the 
determinants of CEO employment contracts and how they affect managers’ investment and 
reporting behavior from shareholders’ perspective. We extend this line of research by focusing 
on the implications of CEO employment contracts for debt contracting. Our findings suggest that 
while CEO contractual protection aligns CEOs’ and shareholders’ interests, it can adversely 
affect debtholders’ interest and thus affect debt contracting, which represents an unintended cost 
of such contracts. Thus our paper complements prior research that has focused on the benefits of 
CEO contracts to shareholders and, together with prior research, provides a more complete 
understanding of the economic consequences of CEO employment contracts. 
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 Second, our paper also contributes to the literature on the relationship between CEO equity 
incentives and debt contracting. Prior studies have examined how managerial ownership and 
equity-based compensation affect the pricing of public debt (Bagnani et al. 1994; Begley and 
Feltham 1999; Ortiz-Molina 2006) and debt maturity (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman 2005; 
Brockman, Martin, and Unlu 2010). 3 Both CEO contractual protection and equity incentives can 
align the interests of CEOs and shareholders and adversely affect debtholders, but the underlying 
reasons are different. While equity incentives enhance the upside potential of risky investments 
for CEOs, contractual protection increases their job security and limits the downside risk. We 
provide evidence on the incremental effect of CEO contractual protection, which is widely used 
in practice. In addition, we examine both private debt and public debt, providing a more 
comprehensive picture of the impact of CEO employment contracts on debt contracting than 
prior research. Finally, because private lenders have stronger incentives and greater resources to 
monitor firms (Beatty et al. 2012), we examine not only the pricing of debt as in prior studies, 
but also the monitoring mechanisms (financial covenants and performance-pricing provisions) 
that private lenders use in response to CEO contracts.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample and data. Section 4 reports the main 
analyses, Section 5 the cross-sectional tests, and Section 6 the additional analyses. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
                                                 
3 Another stream of literature examines how CEO debt-like compensation (i.e., CEO inside debt) can be used to 
align the interests of CEOs and debtholders and reduce debt contracting costs (e.g., Sundaram and Yermack 2007; 
Chava, Kumar, and Warga 2010; Wei and Yermack 2011; Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 2014). Our paper, in 
contrast, focuses on the unintended debt contracting consequences of using CEO employment contracts to align the 
interests of CEOs and shareholders. In addition, our results hold after controlling for CEO inside debt.  
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2.1 Literature review 
Prior research on CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements  
Following Chen et al. (2015), we focus on CEO contractual protection in the form of CEO 
employment agreements and severance pay agreements. As discussed in Gillan et al. (2009), 
CEO employment agreement (EA) is a comprehensive written agreement that specifies the 
employment terms between a firm and its CEO, including the CEO’s responsibilities, 
compensation, perquisites, termination conditions and payments (e.g., severance pay), and 
restrictions on outside activities. An EA typically has a fixed term, ranging from two to five 
years. It can be renewed, amended, or extended. Within the contract terms, the CEO cannot be 
dismissed without good cause. Good cause typically includes a breach of fiduciary duties and 
willful misconduct, but it does not include poor performance. Unlike those with EAs, CEOs 
without EAs are employed at will. These CEOs can be removed whenever the boards find it to be 
in the best interest of the firms. As described in Rau and Xu (2013), Chen et al. (2015), and 
Cadman et al. (2016), a severance pay agreement (SA) specifies conditions and the amount of 
the payments to a CEO upon the CEO’s dismissal without good cause. Unlike an EA, an SA 
does not have a fixed term and thus it covers the CEO for the foreseeable future.  
Both EAs and SAs are the outcome of negotiations between CEOs and their firms. From 
the CEOs’ perspective, such agreements are beneficial because they offer protection. The benefit 
likely increases with the uncertainty over whether the CEO is a good fit for the firm and the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal (Schwab and Thomas 2006). From the firm’s perspective, such 
agreements make it more costly to renegotiate with a CEO or to terminate the CEO’s 
employment. However, these agreements allow the firm to attract good CEO candidates who 
might not consider the position otherwise. These agreements can be used ex ante to address the 
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agency problems, such as CEOs engaging in suboptimal behavior to increase short-term 
performance at the expense of long-term firm value or avoiding risky but positive net present 
value projects (Almazan and Suarez 2003; Inderst and Mueller 2005; Rau and Xu 2013).  
Several recent studies examine the determinants of EAs or SAs and generally conclude that 
the use of EAs and SAs is the outcome of optimal contracting. For example, Gillan et al. (2009) 
find that CEOs are more likely to have EAs when the uncertainty of the business environment is 
higher, when the likelihood of CEO being replaced is greater, and when CEOs have more to lose 
if replaced. Rau and Xu (2013) and Cadman et al. (2016) find that SAs are more likely to be used 
when executives’ human capital is at greater risk and conclude that SAs are largely a means of 
compensating for risk.4 
Prior research on CEO equity incentives and debt contracting  
CEO equity incentives, while aligning the interests of CEOs and shareholders, can 
adversely affect debt contracting. Prior research examines how CEO equity incentives affect the 
pricing of public debt and debt maturity. For example, Bagnani et al. (1994) document a positive 
correlation between managerial ownership and bond return premia. Ortiz-Molina (2006) 
documents a positive correlation between managerial ownership, particularly the ownership of 
stock options, and bond yield. Begley and Feltham (1999) find that managerial ownership is 
positively correlated with the use of dividend and borrowing covenants for public debt. Datta et 
al. (2005) find that managerial ownership is negatively associated with debt maturity. Brockman 
et al. (2010) find a negative (positive) association between CEO portfolio delta (vega) and the 
                                                 
4 As discussed in Chen et al. (2015), it can also be argued that EAs and SAs are the outcome of CEO entrenchment 
(e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004). For example, Yermack (2006) and Rusticus (2006) find that the use of SAs is higher 
for firms with weaker corporate governance. As discussed later, CEO entrenchment cannot explain the adverse 
implications of CEO contractual protection for debt contracting because some prior studies argue that CEO 
entrenchment reduces debtholder-shareholder agency conflict, leading to a prediction that is opposite to our 
findings. In addition, it cannot explain our cross-sectional results that the effect of CEO contractual protection on 
debt contracting varies predictably with CEO’s risk-taking appetite and risk-taking opportunities.  
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proportion of short-term debt in total debt. Our study differs from and complements the above-
mentioned studies by investigating the impact on debt contracting of CEO contractual protection, 
which reduces CEOs’ downside risk. In addition, we examine both the pricing and non-pricing 
elements (i.e., financial covenants and performance-pricing provisions) of debt contracting, 
providing a comprehensive picture of the impact of CEO contractual protection on debt 
contracting.  
2.2 The main predictions 
When deciding the loan terms, creditors are concerned with managers’ actions that affect 
their investment return, i.e., the firms’ ability to pay interest and principal. CEO contractual 
protection can affect the loan terms because it can change CEOs’ risk-taking behavior. First, as 
discussed in prior research, it is more costly for a firm to dismiss a CEO with contractual 
protection. Thus CEOs with contractual protection are better protected from poor performance 
and have higher job security. The evidence in prior studies is consistent with this argument. For 
example, Rusticus (2006) and Xu (2011) find that the likelihood of CEO turnover after poor 
performance is lower when CEOs have employment agreements and severance pay agreements. 
Second, CEO contractual protection, at least partly, compensates CEOs for downside risk. As 
argued in Rau and Xu (2013), the termination payment is a form of deferred compensation and 
protects CEOs from downside risk.  
Both the enhanced job security and the deferred risk premium encourage the CEO to 
undertake risky, long-term projects. For example, Gillan et al. (2009) argue that “CEOs facing 
less uncertainty are less likely to avoid risky positive net present value projects.” Huang (2011) 
and Xu (2011) provide evidence that CEO contractual protection positively influences the level 
of firms’ long-term investments.  
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It thus follows that when CEOs have contractual protection, lenders will monitor the firms 
more closely. Prior research argues that financial covenants can help debtholders to monitor 
management by reducing managers’ discretion and by defining the circumstances under which 
debtholders can intervene (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979; Aghion and Bolton 1992). Christensen 
and Nikolaev (2012) further argue that performance covenants, an important group of financial 
covenants, act as tripwires to detect early signals of financial distress; when a performance 
covenant is violated, lenders can have the control rights and take actions to limit their losses 
(e.g., through renegotiation and the acceleration of loans). Performance pricing provisions, which 
tie interest rates to pre-specified performance measures, also facilitate lenders’ monitoring 
(Asquith, Beatty, and Webber 2005).  
Besides the above risk-taking argument, CEO contractual protection can affect the use of 
financial covenants and performance pricing provisions through another channel. Whether firms 
use these covenants depends on the quality of accounting information. When accounting 
information quality is higher, firms are more likely to use financial covenants and performance 
pricing provisions to address debtholder-shareholder agency problems, and vice versa. For 
example, Costello and Whittenberg-Moerman (2010) find that banks reduce the use of 
accounting-based covenants after firms disclose internal control material weaknesses, which can 
reduce accounting information quality. Because prior research finds that firms with CEO 
contractual protection are less likely to engage in myopic behavior and have weaker incentives to 
engage in earnings management (Chen et al. 2015), these firms likely have higher accounting 
information quality and thus their lenders are more likely to rely on financial covenants and 
performance pricing provisions. 
The above discussion leads to our first two hypotheses:  
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H1: Ceteris paribus, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have more 
financial covenants than those issued by other firms. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection are more likely 
to have performance pricing provisions than those issued by other firms. 
 
However, we might not find results consistent with H1 and H2 for a couple of reasons. 
First, the use of CEO contractual protection might not incentivize managers to undertake risky 
projects. Some prior studies (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Yermack 2006; Rustics 2006) argue 
and document results implying that the use of CEO contractual agreements reflects CEO 
entrenchment. Chava et al. (2010) show that CEO entrenchment can reduce shareholder-
debtholder agency conflict and reduce the use of debt covenants. Second, Armstrong et al. 
(2010) argue that it is difficult to use debt covenants to address firms’ excessive risk-taking 
behavior. Thus, whether CEO contractual protection affect the use of financial covenants and 
performance pricing provisions, as hypothesized in H1 and H2, is an empirical question.  
Lenders use covenants and interest rates jointly to address the problem of CEOs 
undertaking risky investments. To the extent that debt covenants cannot fully address the 
problem or the use of debt covenants becomes too restrictive and costly, interest rate is expected 
to be higher in firms with CEO contractual protection than in other firms. As such, we expect the 
following: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have higher 
spread than those issued by other firms. 
 
However, the accounting information quality argument implies the opposite prediction for 
loan spread. Unlike the risk-taking argument where the debtholder-shareholder conflict is 
expected to increase due to the increased risk-taking incentives of CEOs with contractual 
protection, the debtholder-shareholder agency conflict does not change with the use of CEO 
contractual protection under the accounting information quality argument. This argument implies 
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that a greater use of financial covenants and performance pricing provisions reduces the agency 
conflict and in turn loan spread. Thus, the results from the test of H3 can shed light on which 
argument – the risk-taking argument or the accounting information quality argument – is more 
applicable in this setting. 
Monetary strength of CEO contractual protection 
As discussed in Chen et al. (2015), the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection 
varies across firms. While some firms offer the annual base salary as the severance pay, others 
pay three times more. When the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection is stronger, its 
effect on CEOs’ risk-taking behavior is expected to be more pronounced and its effect on 
corporate decisions is also stronger (Chen et al. 2015).5 It thus follows that the effect of CEO 
contractual protection on the use of debt covenants and interest rate increases with the monetary 
strength of CEO contractual protection. Thus we hypothesize that: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, the effect of CEO contractual protection on the use of debt covenants 
and spread, as hypothesized in H1, H2, and H3, increases with the monetary strength 
of CEO contractual protection. 
 
2.3 Cross-sectional variation 
In this section, we develop hypotheses on the cross-sectional variation in the effect of CEO 
contractual protection on debt contracting. When developing the main predictions (H1, H2, and 
H3), we argue that CEO contractual protection affects debt contracting because it changes CEOs’ 
risk-taking behavior. Hence, the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting should 
vary systematically with CEOs’ appetite for risk-taking and their opportunities to undertake risky 
projects.  
Some CEOs have a lower appetite for risk-taking than others because of their concerns 
                                                 
5 Unlike Chen et al. (2015), we do not examine the duration of CEO contractual protection because of its low cross-
sectional variation, leading to low power of test.  
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with the adverse effect of increased firm risk on their welfare.6 CEO contractual protection is 
expected to be less effective in inducing these CEOs to undertake risky investments. It then 
follows that the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting will be weaker for the 
CEOs who have a lower appetite for risk-taking. Based on prior research, we identify two types 
of CEOs who have a lower appetite for risk-taking. First, Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Cheng 
(2004) argue that since older CEOs are closer to retirement, they have a shorter investment 
horizon and are less likely to undertake risky, long-term investments. Second, prior studies argue 
that because longer-tenured CEOs have more firm-specific human capital invested in their firms 
and are less diversified, they are less likely to undertake risky projects in order to reduce firm 
risk (Berger, Ofek and Yermack 1997; Chakraborty, Sheikh and Subramanian 2007). Thus, we 
have the following prediction:  
H5: Ceteris paribus, the effect of CEO contractual protection on the use of debt covenants 
and spread, as hypothesized in H1, H2, and H3, is weaker for older CEOs and CEOs 
with longer tenures than for other CEOs.  
 
In addition, CEOs’ ability to undertake risky projects depends on the firms’ growth 
opportunities. The impact of CEO contractual protection on CEOs’ risk-taking is thus likely to 
vary with the firm’s growth opportunities. Prior research (e.g., Hribar and Yehuda 2015) argues 
that firms in the growth stage of their life cycles have more growth opportunities than those in 
the other stages such as mature and declining stages. Such firms’ CEOs will have more 
opportunities to undertake risky long-term projects. Hence the effect of CEO contractual 
protection on CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and then on debt contracting should be stronger for 
such firms, leading to our last hypothesis:  
                                                 
6 Note that firms might be more likely to use CEO contractual protection in order to induce CEOs with low risk 
appetite to undertake risky projects. Here we investigate that given the existence of CEO contractual protection, how 
its effect on debt contracting varies with CEOs’ risk appetite. The same applies to CEOs’ opportunities to undertake 
risky projects. We obtain the same inferences when including these factors in the determinant model of CEO 
contractual protection.  
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H6: Ceteris paribus, the effect of CEO contractual protection on the use of debt covenants 
and spread, as hypothesized in H1, H2, and H3, is stronger for firms in the growth 
stage of life-cycle than for other firms.  
 
3. Sample and research design 
3.1 Sample and data 
The sample for the main analyses includes loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the 1995-
2008 period. We first hand collect CEO protection information from firms’ proxy statements. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that firms disclose any material 
employment agreements or severance pay agreements they have with their top executives in 
proxy statements (Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 299.601). There are 18,936 firm-years that have 
proxy statements available from the SEC’s EDGAR online database. We then match these firm-
years with loan issuance data from the DealScan database. We exclude firm-years without loan 
data, those from financial firms, and those with missing values for the regression variables. For 
the remaining 4,173 firm-years, we obtain all the loans issued in the sample period. Our final 
sample consists of 6,470 loans. Table 1, Panel A summarizes the sample selection process. 
Table 1, Panel B presents the sample loan distribution by year. In general, the number of 
loans increases from the mid-1990s to 2000s, except the sharp drop right before the financial 
crisis period. Out of the sample loans, 77 percent are issued by firms with CEO contractual 
protection. The percentage of loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection increases 
over time, from around 60 percent in the mid-1990s to more than 80 percent in the last few years 
of the sample period.7 The last two columns of the table report the number of loans issued by 
firms with employment agreements and by those with standalone severance pay agreements, 
respectively, both with an increasing time trend. In the main analyses, we combine the two types 
                                                 
7 In the empirical analyses, we control for the time trend. The inferences are the same if we control for year fixed 
effects instead. 
16 
 
of agreements together and in an additional analysis, we examine their separate effects. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample and then separately for loans issued 
by firms with and without CEO protection. Panel A reports descriptive statistics on loan contract 
terms. The average number of financial covenants is 1.50 for the full sample, but it is 
significantly higher for loans issued by firms with CEO protection (1.55) than those by firms 
without CEO protection (1.33). This difference is driven by the greater number of performance 
covenants for loans of firms with CEO protection. Consistent with our prediction in H1, these 
loans on average have 17 percent more financial covenants (17% = [1.55-1.33]/1.33) and 25 
percent more performance covenants (25% = [1.09-0.87]/0.87) than the other loans. There is no 
difference in the number of capital covenants between the loans issued by the two groups of 
firms. 
With respect to the use of performance pricing provisions, 56% of loans have this 
provision. However, 58 percent of loans of firms with CEO protection include this loan contract 
provision, whereas only 51 percent of the other loans do so. The difference of 7 percentage 
points, or a 14 percent relative increase, is significantly different from zero, consistent with H2. 
We also find that loans of firms with CEO protection on average have a higher loan spread 
(129.91) than the other loans (102.13). The 27.78 basis point difference represents a relative 
increase of 27 percent. This result is consistent with H3. 
Regarding other loan contract terms, we find that loans of firms with CEO protection have 
a slightly longer maturity and a smaller size, and are more likely to be secured, while they are 
less likely to have missing information on loan security.8  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics on firm characteristics. Firms with CEO protection are 
                                                 
8 For the sake of completeness, we also examine whether CEO contractual protection affects loan maturity and 
security, but we do not find any significant results in multivariate regressions.  
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smaller and have a lower market-to-book ratio, higher leverage, lower return on assets, lower z-
score, and lower CEO equity ownership. Due to these differences, we control for all these firm 
characteristics in our multivariate analyses.  
3.2 Research design 
Our hypotheses H1-H3 predict that loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection 
have more financial covenants, are more likely to have performance pricing provisions, and have 
higher loan spreads. To test these predictions, we follow prior literature (e.g., Ortiz-Molina 2006; 
Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008; Kim, Song, and Zhang 2011; Christensen and Nikolaev 
2012) and use the following regression model:  
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,  (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan features of a loan contract: 
(1) the number of financial covenants (Covenants), (2) the indicator for the existence of 
performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing), and (3) the logged value of loan spread 
(Loan_Spread), which is measured as the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the 
LIBOR for the drawn portion of the loan facility, as commonly defined in prior research (e.g., 
Kim et al. 2011). Given the distribution of these three dependent variables, we adopt the Poisson, 
Logit, and OLS regression methods for these three dependent variables, respectively. 
The variable of interest, CEO_Protectioni,t, is an indicator variable for CEO contractual 
protection, which is equal to 1 if the firm has an employment agreement or a standalone 
severance pay agreement with its CEO, and 0 otherwise. The hypotheses imply that the 
coefficient on CEO_Protection, β, is positive for all three loan features. The standard errors are 
adjusted for firm clustering.  
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We control for the borrower-specific characteristics that prior research has shown to affect 
the terms of loan contracts. Prior studies show that debt covenants are more prevalent in the loan 
contracts when the borrowing firms are smaller, less profitable, more levered and have higher 
growth (e.g., Ball, Li, and Shivakumar 2015). Hence, we control for firm size (Size), return on 
assets (Return on Assets), leverage (Leverage), and the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book). 
In addition, the availability of collateral, as proxied for by the amount of tangible assets, default 
risk, and cash flow volatility, of the borrowers also affect the loan contract terms (e.g., Chava, 
Kumar and Warga 2010; Kim et al. 2011). Consequently, we control for firm’s asset tangibility 
(Tangibility), the modified Altman’s z-score (Z-score), and the volatility of operating cash flows 
(Cash Flow Volatility).  
Prior studies find that CEOs’ ownership and compensation structure affect their exposure 
to risk and hence debt contracting (e.g., Brockman et al. 2010). Therefore, we control for CEOs’ 
ownership and compensation structure. Specifically, we include three variables of CEO equity 
incentives: (1) CEO Equity Compensation, measured as the ratio of the CEO’s stock and option 
grants to his/her total compensation; (2) CEO Equity Ownership, measured as the CEO’s stock 
and option holdings in shares divided by the firm’s total number of shares outstanding; and (3) 
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity (to stock volatility), defined as the change in the value of the CEO’s 
option portfolio resulting from a 1% increase in the firm’s annualized standard deviation of stock 
return.  
The cost of debt and the use of covenants in the loan contracts are also affected by loan 
characteristics. Prior research finds that lenders charge a lower interest rate for loans with shorter 
maturity and larger facilities (e.g., Graham et al. 2008). Therefore, we include the maturity 
(Loan_Maturity) and size of the loan (Loan_Amount) in the regression. Moreover, because the 
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contract terms can affect loan spread, we add four more loan-specific variables to the model of 
loan spread: the number of covenants (Number of Covenants), the indicator for performance 
pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing), the indicator for secured loans (Secured_Loan), and 
the indicator for loans with missing information on loan security (Secured_Missing). 
Lastly, following prior studies (Kim et al. 2011; Campello and Gao 2015), we also control 
for the potential effect of macroeconomic conditions by adding the GDP growth (∆GDP) and the 
time trend variable (Time Trend) to the regressions.  
We measure the borrower-specific characteristics in the fiscal year immediately before the 
debt issuance date and the other control variables concurrently with the loan issuance. Appendix 
A provides the detailed variable measurements. For all the regressions, we also control for the 
loan type, loan purpose, and industry fixed effects. Because of the inclusion of these fixed 
effects, we do not report the intercept.  
3.3 Controlling for the endogeneity of CEO contractual protection 
As discussed in prior research (e.g., Gillan et al. 2009; Rau and Xu 2013; and Chen et al. 
2015), CEO contractual protection is endogenously determined. Some firm and CEO 
characteristics can affect both the use of CEO contractual protection and debt contracting (i.e., 
the use of covenants and loan spread). Following Chen et al. (2015), we use two approaches to 
address the potential endogeneity of CEO contractual protection. First, in Equation (1), we 
replace the CEO contraction protection indicator with the predicted value estimated from a 
determinants model of CEO contractual protection. Second, we adopt the Heckman (1979) 
approach and add to Equation (1) the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the determinant model. 
Both approaches have been widely used in the literature to address endogeneity (e.g., Doidge et 
al. 2004).  
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For the CEO contractual protection determinant model, we adopt the specification in Chen 
et al. (2015). The determinants include a number of firm and CEO characteristics (R&D, market-
to-book ratio, market-adjusted returns, ROA, indicator for outside CEOs, CEO age, CEO 
abnormal compensation, CEO incentive-based compensation, board independence, indicator for 
founder CEO, leverage, and assets) and five state policy variables (public policy, implied 
contract, good faith and fair dealing, anti-takeover regulation, and the Garmaise index) that affect 
the use of CEO contractual protection. Please see Chen et al. (2015) for details. The results of the 
determinant model based on our sample of S&P 1500 firms are similar to those reported in Chen 
et al. (2015) for S&P 500 firms. As such, we do not report the results to save space. The five 
state policy variables are the exogenous instrumental variables. Untabulated tests indicate that 
the state policy variables are valid and effective instruments. We also follow Larcker and 
Rusticus’s (2010) recommendation and report results when the potential endogeneity is not 
controlled for in order to ensure the robustness of the results.  
 
4. Main analyses – Tests of H1, H2, and H3 
4.1 Results for H1 
In this section, we use Poisson regressions to examine the impact of CEO contractual 
protection on the use of financial covenants in loan contracts. Panel A of Table 3 reports the 
regression results. We first report the regression results without controlling for endogeneity 
(Column (1)). We then report the regression results after controlling for endogeneity by replacing 
the CEO contractual protection indicator with its predicted value in Column (2) and including the 
Inverse Mills Ratio in Column (3).  
Column (1) shows that CEO contractual protection is positively correlated with the number 
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of financial covenants (p-value = 0.043). (We use one-sided p-values for variables of interest 
throughout the paper.) The untabulated marginal effect of CEO_Protection suggests that the loan 
contracts for firms with CEO protection have on average 0.089 more financial covenants than 
other firms, or a relative increase of 6.7 percent from the sample average for firms without CEO 
contractual protection (which is 1.33 as reported in Table 2). In Column (2), we use the predicted 
value for the probability of having CEO contractual protection. We find that the coefficient on 
CEO contractual protection remains significantly positive (p-value = 0.091). In the last column 
where we include the Inverse Mills Ratio, the result for CEO protection is similar with a positive 
coefficient on CEO_Protection (p-value = 0.069). These results are consistent with H1 that when 
the borrowing firm’s CEO is better protected, the lenders seek for better protection for their loans 
by adding more financial covenants.  
With respect to control variables, we find that loan contracts contain fewer financial 
covenants for the firms that are larger and have higher growth potential (higher market-to-book 
ratio). On the other hand, loan contracts contain more financial covenants for firms with higher 
leverage and higher CEO equity ownership. In addition, loans with a larger amount tend to 
include more financial covenants and there is an increasing trend in the use of financial 
covenants. These results are consistent with the findings in prior studies (e.g., Christensen and 
Nikolaev 2012).  
Performance versus capital covenants 
As discussed in Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), the two types of financial covenants, 
performance and capital covenants, limit debt-related agency problems in different ways. 
Performance covenants are based on current performance metrics, which are timely and forward-
looking indicators of negative trends in credit quality. Therefore, performance covenants serve as 
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efficient tools in monitoring firms’ ongoing performance and provide lenders with options to 
renegotiate or restrain managerial actions when firm performance deteriorates. This type of 
covenants is effective in monitoring the potential adverse consequences of excessive risk taking.  
 In contrast, capital covenants address debt-related agency problems by ensuring that 
shareholders have enough money inside the firm (through limiting the amount of debt, raising 
additional equity capital, or cutting back on dividends). This type of covenants can ensure that 
there will be enough money left to debtholders in case of financial distress and that shareholders’ 
wealth is sensitive to managerial actions in order to incentivize them to monitor management. 
However, since capital covenants are based on cumulated profitability, they are less useful to 
lenders in close monitoring of managerial actions and intervening with firm decisions when 
necessary.  
As discussed above, the main concern with CEO protection for debtholders is that CEOs 
with contractual protection are more inclined to take on risky projects. Thus, capital covenants’ 
role will be limited in addressing the impact of CEO protection because they are not breached as 
long as firms maintain adequate amount of equity capital. Hence we expect performance 
covenants to be used more often for firms with CEO protection than for the other firms, but we 
do not expect capital covenants to differ between firms with and without CEO contractual 
protection.  
To investigate whether firms with and without CEO contractual protection differ in the use 
of performance and capital covenants, as predicted above, we use a similar research design as in 
Panel A of Table 3 when we examine the number of financial covenants. Panel B reports the 
results for the analyses of performance covenants. Column (1) shows that CEO contractual 
protection is positively correlated with the number of performance covenants (p-value = 0.041). 
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The untabulated marginal effect suggests that the loan contracts for firms with CEO protection 
have on average 0.074 more performance covenants than other firms, or a relative increase of 8.5 
percent from the sample average for firms without CEO contractual protection (which is 0.87 as 
reported in Table 2). In Column (2) we use the predicted value of the probability of having CEO 
protection, and find that the coefficient on CEO contractual protection remains significantly 
positive (p-value = 0.030). In the last column where we include the Inverse Mills Ratio, the 
result for CEO protection is similar with a positive coefficient and a p-value of 0.024. These 
results are consistent with the argument that when the borrowing firm’s CEO is better protected 
by employment agreements or severance pay agreements, the lenders seek better protection for 
their loans by adding more performance covenants.  
Panel C of Table 3 reports the results for the analyses of capital covenants. As expected, we 
find that the number of capital covenants in loan contracts does not differ significantly between 
firms with and without CEO contractual protection. This result indicates that private lenders use 
covenants selectively to achieve the goal of monitoring risky investments.9 This test also helps 
us further refute an alternative explanation for our results – debt contracting is affected by high-
risk firms self-selecting into having CEO contractual protection, not by the CEO contracts per se. 
Under this alternative explanation, the loans issued by firms with CEO protection should have 
more capital covenants than loans issued by other firms. However, we do not observe this result. 
In sum, we find results consistent with H1 that when the borrowing firm’s CEO is better 
protected by employment agreements or severance pay agreements, the lenders seek better 
protection for their loans by adding more financial covenants. This result is driven by 
performance covenants as they are more effective in constraining CEOs’ excessive risk-taking 
                                                 
9 An alternative, non-exclusive, explanation for our finding on capital covenants is that the use of capital covenants 
(mostly balance-sheet based) has been less prevalent over time due to the movement to fair value accounting and the 
compromised value of balance sheet numbers for debt contracting (Demerjian 2011).  
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behavior. As such, for the following analyses of covenants, we focus on performance covenants 
only to increase the power of test.  
4.2 Results for H2 
We then examine the impact of CEO contractual protection on the likelihood of including 
performance pricing provisions in loan contracts. Table 4 reports the regression results. As 
shown in Column (1), CEO protection is positively correlated with the inclusion of performance 
pricing provisions in loan contracts (p-value = 0.016). The effect is also economically 
significant: the untabulated marginal effect of CEO contractual protection is 0.058, a relative 
increase of 11.4 percent from the sample average for firms without CEO contractual protection 
(which is 0.51 as reported in Table 2). The positive correlation still holds after we control for the 
potential endogeneity in both columns (2) and (3) (p-value = 0.001 in both columns).  
The regression results also show that loans are less likely to include performance pricing 
provisions for larger firms and firms with higher growth. With respect to loan characteristics, we 
find that the performance pricing provisions are more likely to be included in loans with a longer 
maturity and a larger amount. There is also an increasing trend in the use of performance pricing 
provisions. 
In sum, these findings are consistent with H2 that compared with loans of other firms, 
loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection are more likely to contain performance 
pricing provisions.  
4.3 Results for H3 
Table 5 presents the regression results for loan spread (Loan_Spread) as the dependent 
variable. As reported in Column (1), the coefficient on the indicator for CEO contractual 
protection is significantly positive (p-value = 0.005), consistent with H3. The magnitude of the 
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coefficient (0.078) suggests an 8.1% increase in spread for firms with CEO contractual 
protection compared with those without (e0.078=1.081). Combined with the findings in previous 
sections, this result suggests that the lenders, on average, charge a higher cost of debt for firms 
with CEO contractual protection, albeit they use more performance covenants and are more 
likely to include performance pricing provisions in loan contracts. After controlling for 
endogeneity, we continue to find a positive correlation between CEO contractual protection and 
loan spread in columns (2) and (3) (p-value = 0.013 and 0.005, respectively). In sum, these 
findings are consistent with H3 that compared with loans of other firms, loans issued by firms 
with CEO contractual protection have higher spreads. The findings also indicate that the risk-
taking argument, instead of the accounting information quality argument, is more applicable in 
the setting of CEO protection and debt contracting.  
The results on the control variables are generally consistent with prior studies on loan 
pricing (e.g., Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011). Specifically, we find that loan spread is 
negatively associated with firm size, the market-to-book ratio, return on assets, and z-score, and 
is positively correlated with firms’ leverage and CEO equity ownership. For loan-specific 
variables, we document a lower loan spread for the loans with a longer maturity, a larger amount, 
and more covenants; and a higher loan spread for the loans with performance pricing provisions, 
secured loans, and the loans with missing information on loan security. Moreover, the loan 
spread is smaller when the macroeconomic conditions are better (i.e., higher GDP growth) and is 
increasing over the sample period.  
 
5. Cross-sectional analyses – Tests of H4, H5, and H6 
In this section, we report cross-sectional analyses results – tests of H4, H5, and H6. For 
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these analyses, we only tabulate the results based on the Heckman approach to save space. Using 
the raw or predicted value of the probability of CEO contractual protection in the regressions 
leads to the same inferences. 
5.1 CEO contractual protection and loan contracting—the monetary strength of protection 
In this section, we report the tests of H4—whether the effect of CEO contractual protection 
on debt contracting increases with its monetary strength. Following prior studies (e.g., Rau and 
Xu 2013; Chen et al. 2015), we measure the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection 
using the amount of the pre-determined severance pay. Specifically, we calculate the severance 
pay multiple as the ratio of the severance pay to the base salary, and we then construct an ordinal 
variable, Strength, to capture the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection.10 Strength is 
coded as 2 (1, 0) if the multiple is above three (between two and three, below two). For the loans 
of firms without CEO contractual protection, we also code Strength as 0. We exclude from this 
analysis those loan observations from firms with CEO contractual protection but without the 
information on severance pay.11 The following regression is used to test the incremental effect of 
the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection: 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 +
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . (2) 
 
Because Strength is coded as 0 for firm-years without CEO contractual protection, 
CEO_Protection × Strength is the same as Strength and thus we do not include Strength in the 
regression. The coefficient on the variable of interest, CEO_Protection × Strength, captures the 
                                                 
10 As noted in Rau and Xu (2013) and Chen et al. (2015), employment agreements and severance pay agreements 
usually also allow unexercisable options (unvested stocks) to become immediately exercisable (vested). However, 
the value is difficult to quantify ex ante. 
11 Among the loan contracts for firms with CEO contractual protection and information on severance pay, 58.7 
(23.0, 18.3) percent have a severance pay multiple above three (between two and three, below two).  
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incremental effect of CEO protection with stronger monetary protection (i.e., Strength =1 or 2). 
We expect a positive coefficient on this interaction term.  
Table 6 presents the regression results, Column (1) for the number of performance 
covenants, Column (2) for the use of performance pricing provisions, and Column (3) for loan 
spreads. As shown in Table 6, the coefficients on CEO_Protection are positive but only 
statistically significant in Column (2), suggesting that the effect of CEO protection is weak when 
the severance pay multiple is low. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient on 
CEO_Protection × Strength is significantly positive in all three regressions (p-value = 0.051, 
0.004 and 0.014, respectively), indicating a larger effect of CEO contractual protection for those 
firms with stronger monetary protection in CEOs’ contracts.  
In sum, we find that the effect of CEO contractual protection on loan features increases 
with its monetary strength. These findings reinforce the inference from the main analyses.  
5.2 CEO contractual protection and loan contracting—CEOs’ appetite for risk-taking 
In this section, we report the results from the tests of H5. We add to the regressions the 
main effect of the conditional variable and its interaction with the CEO contractual protection 
indicator:  
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 .  (3) 
     
The conditional variable, Conditional_Var, is one of the following two indicator variables, 
Old_CEO and Long_Tenure. Old_CEO equals one if the CEO’s age is 64 or higher, and zero 
otherwise. Long_Tenure equals one if the CEO’s tenure is four years or more, and zero 
otherwise. (The sample median of CEO tenure is four years.) H5 predicts that the effect of CEO 
protection on debt contracting is weaker for firms with an old CEO and for firms whose CEO’s 
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tenure is long. As such, the coefficient on the interaction term, 𝛽3, is expected to be negative.  
Table 7 reports the results for the tests of H5, Panel A for CEO age and Panel B for CEO 
tenure. As reported in Panel A, the coefficient on CEO_Protection is significantly positive in all 
three regressions, suggesting that the effect of CEO protection is strong when the CEO is 
relatively young and the contractual protection is expected to induce risk taking. However, when 
the CEO is older and has a weaker appetite to pursue risky projects, the effect of CEO 
contractual protection is attenuated; the coefficient on CEO_Protection × Old_CEO is 
significantly negative in both Columns (1) and (3) where the number of performance covenants 
and loan spreads are examined, respectively (p-value = 0.013 and 0.039, respectively).  
The results based on CEO tenure are similar. As reported in Panel B of Table 7, the 
coefficient on CEO_ Protection is significantly positive in all three regressions, indicating that 
the effect of CEO contractual protection is strong when the CEO is relatively new to the 
company. However, when the CEO has served longer and his appetite of risk-taking becomes 
weaker, the effect of CEO protection is weakened; the coefficient on CEO_Protection × 
Long_Tenure is significantly negative in all three regressions (p-value = 0.000, 0.026, and 0.087, 
respectively). 
5.3 CEO contractual protection and loan contracting—CEOs’ opportunities for risk-taking 
To test H6 that the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting is stronger 
when CEOs have more opportunities for risk-taking, we use the same design as the tests of H5. 
For this purpose, Conditional_Var in Equation (3) is an indicator variable for growth stage, 
Growth_Stage. Growth_Stage equals one if the firm-year is in the growth stage of the life cycle, 
and zero otherwise. Following Hribar and Yehuda (2015), we create a life-cycle-stage score by 
summing the standardized values of (1) sales growth, (2) capital expenditures, (3) net-capital 
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transactions, and (4) (inverse ranking of) firm age.12 Firm-years ranked in the top quintile based 
on the summary score are classified into the growth life-cycle stage. H6 predicts a stronger effect 
for firms in their growth life-cycle stage. As such, the coefficient on the interaction term, 𝛽3, is 
expected to be positive. 
Table 8 reports the results for the tests of H6. The coefficient on CEO_ Protection is 
insignificant in the three regressions, suggesting that the effect of CEO contractual protection is 
weak when the firm is outside of the growth stage of its life cycle. However, when the firm is in 
its growth stage and hence has more investment opportunities and greater risk-taking propensity, 
the effect of CEO contractual protection is stronger; the coefficient on CEO_Protection × 
Growth_Stage is significantly positive in all three regressions (p-value = 0.004, 0.016, and 0.080, 
respectively).  
In sum, consistent with H5 and H6, the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt 
contracting is weaker for firms with an old CEO and for firms with a longer-tenured CEO, but is 
stronger for firms in the growth life-cycle stage. These results suggest that the effect of CEO 
contractual protection on debt contracting varies systematically with CEOs’ appetite for risk-
taking and CEOs’ risk-taking opportunities.  
 
6. Additional tests 
6.1 CEO contractual protection and bond yield spread 
In this section, we examine the impact of CEO contractual protection on the pricing of 
public bond, i.e., bond yield. This test helps to broaden the scope of study by including public 
debt, and finding consistent results helps to strengthen the inferences based on private debt 
                                                 
12 We standardize each variable by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation. The calculation 
uses firm-year observations from the Compustat universe during the sample period. For each firm-year, we sum the 
four standardized values together to obtain a summary life-cycle-stage score. 
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contracting. Following Bharath et al. (2008), we focus on the pricing of public bond and do not 
examine the non-price terms of public debt. Public debt lacks renegotiation flexibility because 
firms must receive the unanimous consent of public bondholders to alter any of the material 
terms, making re-contracting extremely difficult for public debt. In addition, due to the small 
ownership of individual bond holders and free-riding problems, bond holders lack the incentives 
to monitor the firm. Hence we argue that in the case of public debt, the price term is the primary 
contractual feature used to address the riskiness of investments in the presence of CEO 
contractual protection.  
As in prior research (e.g., Liao 2015; Pan, Wang, and Weisbach 2015), we measure bond 
yield spread as the difference between the offering yield of a bond and the yield of treasure bills 
with a similar maturity. This variable is measured in percentage for ease of result interpretation. 
We use the same list of control variables and the same research design as the earlier analyses to 
be consistent. The sample includes 2,201 new bond issuances by the sample firms over the 
period 1995-2008.  
Table 9 reports the regression results. As expected, the bond yield spread is significantly 
higher for firms with CEO contractual protection than for the other firms (p-value = 0.053 in 
column (1)). The coefficient on CEO_Protection in Column (1) (0.206) implies that compared to 
bonds issued by firms without CEO contractual protection, those issued by firms with CEO 
contractual protection have 20.2% higher spread (the average bond yield spread is 1.02 percent 
for firms without CEO contractual protection). The results hold after controlling for the 
endogeneity of CEO contractual protection in columns (2) and (3) (p-value = 0.027 and 0.018, 
respectively).  
In sum, the result based on public bonds is consistent with those based on private debt and 
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further strengthens the main inference.13  
6.2 Switch firms 
As noted in Chen et al. (2015), while some firms consistently use or do not use CEO 
protection throughout the sample period (referred to as non-switch firms), other firms switch 
back and forth (referred to as switch firms). To ensure that non-switch firms do not drive our 
results and to further alleviate the endogeneity concern, we examine whether our results hold for 
the switch firms (i.e., using the same firm as control). The untabulated analysis indicates that the 
results are qualitatively similar.  
In addition, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis using a subset of switch firms – 
the firms that do not have CEO contractual protection in the earlier years and have it in the later 
years of the sample period. The control firms include those firms that do not have CEO 
contractual protection throughout the sample period. Table 10 reports the regression results.14 
We find that compared to the control firms, the switch firms are not significantly different in the 
number of performance covenants, the likelihood of performance pricing provisions, and the loan 
spread in the years when these switch firms do not CEO contractual protection. However, once 
these firms have CEO contractual protection, they experience an increase in the number of 
performance covenants, the likelihood of performance pricing provisions, and loan spread.  
Overall, these results confirm the earlier results and strengthen our inferences.  
6.3 CAPEX covenants 
Some loans contain covenants that restrict firms’ capital investments by specifying the 
maximum capital expenditures (referred to as CAPEX covenants). Given that one of the key 
                                                 
13 We also conduct similar cross-sectional analyses as in Section 5 and find similar results, with the exception of life 
cycle where we do not find significant results.  
14 Because firms issue new loans in different years and the number of control firms is small, it is impractical to 
match treatment (switch) firms with control firms. As such, we use loans of all control firms as the benchmark.  
32 
 
arguments for our hypotheses is that CEOs with contractual protection are more likely to 
undertake risky projects, it seems natural to expect that loans issued by these firms are more 
likely to include CAPEX covenants so that debtholders can directly restrict firms’ risk-taking 
behavior. However, such covenants are very restrictive and are thus costly to the firms. Firms, 
especially those that would like the CEOs to undertake investments, are less willing to accept 
such covenants. In addition, these covenants are usually included only for firms with high default 
risk, where the asset substitution issue is particularly severe. Lastly, not all risky projects are in 
the form of capital investments. For example, investment in R&D is usually not covered in 
CAPEX covenants.  Because of these reasons, we do not have clear prediction for the use of 
CAPEX covenants and do not investigate CAPEX covenants in the main analyses.  
Nevertheless, for completeness, we examine whether CEO contractual protection is 
positively associated with the use of CAPEX covenants. For this purpose, we use the same 
methodology as for performance pricing provisions by replacing the dependent variable with an 
indicator for the use of CAPEX covenants. We do not find any significant results for the full 
sample.  However, for the sample of firms with high default risk (i.e., Z-score lower than 1.8 as 
in Graham et al. 2008), we find that the coefficient on the CEO contractual protection indicator is 
significantly positive when using the predicted value of CEO protection or using the Heckman 
approach to address potential endogeneity (p = 0.025 and 0.042, respectively). That is, we find 
some evidence that the loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection are more likely to 
include CAPEX covenants when they have high default risk.  
6.4 Sensitivity tests 
We conduct a series of sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our results. For the sake 
of brevity we do not tabulate the results. 
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Our inferences remain the same after controlling for the potential effect of corporate 
governance (board independence, E-index, and a founder CEO indicator). The sample size is 
reduced by almost half after the inclusion of these variables. To ensure that the model 
specifications are tractable and the results are generalizable, we do not include these variables in 
the main analyses.  
Our inferences also remain the same after controlling for CEO inside debt for the three 
years when inside debt data is available (2006-2008). We also find that CEO inside debt is 
negatively associated with the number of performance covenants, the likelihood of performance 
pricing provisions, and loan spread. 
In the main analyses, we combine employment agreements and standalone severance pay 
agreements because both types of agreements protect CEOs from downside risk and short-term 
performance swings. In an untabulated analysis, we investigate whether the results hold for both 
types. For this purpose, we construct two indicator variables separately for employment 
agreements and standalone severance pay agreements, and then replace CEO_Protection in the 
above analyses with these two indicators. We find that both indicators have significantly positive 
coefficients with the exception of the impact of standard alone severance pay agreements on the 
number of performance covenants. These results indicate that both employment agreements and 
standalone severance pay agreements significantly affect debt contracting. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment 
agreements and standalone severance pay agreements, affects debt contracting. Compared with 
other CEOs, those with contractual protection are protected from downside risk and short-term 
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performance swings. As such, they have stronger incentives to undertake risky projects. Because 
debtholders do not enjoy the upside potential but bear the negative consequences if the risky 
projects do not pay off, rational debtholders will monitor the firms more closely to protect 
themselves. As such, we predict that compared with loans issued by firms without CEO 
contractual protection, those issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have more 
financial covenants, particularly performance covenants, and are more likely to include 
performance pricing provisions. If the additional covenants and provisions cannot fully address 
the incremental agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders, these loans will also have 
higher spread.  
Based on 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008, we document 
results that are consistent with our predictions. We find that CEO contractual protection is 
associated with a larger number of performance covenants, a higher likelihood of performance 
pricing provisions, and higher loan spreads. We further find that the effect of CEO contractual 
protection increases with the monetary strength of the protection and CEOs’ appetite and 
opportunities for risk-taking. In an additional analysis, we also find a higher yield spread for the 
public bonds issued by firms with CEO contractual protection than those issued by firms without 
CEO contractual protection. Our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables 
(corporate governance and CEO inside debt) and hold for the subset of firms that switch between 
having and not having CEO contractual protection over the sample period.  
Our paper contributes to the literature by examining how CEO contractual protection 
affects debt contracting. The findings suggest that CEO contractual protection increases the cost 
of debt, a potentially unintended consequence of using CEO employment agreements and 
severance pay agreements. Therefore, our study complements prior studies that investigate how 
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CEO contractual protection affects corporate decisions from shareholders’ perspectives.   
36 
 
References 
 
Aghion, P., and P. Bolton. 1992. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting. Review of 
Economic Studies 59: 473-494. 
Almazan, A., and J. Suarez. 2003. Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures. 
Journal of Finance 58 (2): 519-547. 
Anantharaman, D., V. W. Fang, and G. Gong. 2014. Inside debt and the design of corporate debt 
contracts. Management Science 60 (5):1260-1280. 
Armstrong, C. S., A. D. Jagolinzer, and D. F. Larcker. 2010. Chief executive officer equity incentives and 
accounting irregularities. Journal of Accounting Research 48 (2): 225-271.  
Asquith, P., A. Beatty, and J. Weber. 2005. Performance pricing in bank debt contracts. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 40 (1): 101-128. 
Bagnani, E., N. T. Milonas, A. Saunders, and N. G. Travlos. 1994. Managers, owners, and the pricing of 
risky debt: An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 49 (2): 453-477. 
Ball, R., X. Li, and L. Shivakumar. 2015. Contractibility and transparency of financial statement 
information prepared under IFRS: Evidence from debt contracts around IFRS adoption. Journal of 
Accounting Research 53 (5): 915-963. 
Beatty, A., S. Liao, and J. Weber. 2012. Evidence on the determinants and economic consequences of 
delegated monitoring. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (3): 555-576. 
Bebchuk, L., and J. Fried. 2004. Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive 
compensation. Harvard University Press.  
Begley, J., and G. A. Feltham. 1999. An empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and 
management incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 229-259. 
Berger, P., E. Ofek, and D. Yermack. 1997. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. 
Journal of Finance 52 (4): 1411-1438. 
Bharath, S. T., J. Sunder, and S. V. Sunder. 2008. Accounting quality and debt contracting. The 
Accounting Review 83 (1): 1-28. 
Brockman, P., X. Martin, and E. Unlu. 2010. Executive compensation and the maturity structure of 
corporate debt. Journal of Finance 65 (3): 1123-1161. 
Cadman, B. D., J. L. Campbell, and S. Klasa. 2016. Are ex-ante CEO severance pay contracts consistent 
with efficient contracting? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51 (3): 737-769.  
Campello, M., and J. Gao. 2015. Customer concentration and loan contract terms. Working paper, Cornell 
University. 
Chakraborty, A., Sheikh, S., and Subramanian, N., 2007. Termination risk and managerial risk taking. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (1): 170-188. 
Chava, S., P. Kumar, and A. Warga. 2010. Managerial agency and bond covenants. Review of Financial 
Studies 23 (3): 1120-1148. 
Chen, X., Q. Cheng, A. Lo, and X. Wang. 2015. CEO contractual protection and managerial short-
termism. The Accounting Review 90 (5): 1871-1906. 
Cheng, S. 2004. R&D expenditures and CEO compensation. The Accounting Review 79 (2): 305-328. 
37 
 
Christensen, H. B., and V. V. Nikolaev. 2012. Capital versus performance governance in debt contracts. 
Journal of Accounting Research 50 (1): 75-116. 
Costello, A., and R. Wittenberg-Moerman. 2011. The impact of financial reporting quality on debt 
contracting: Evidence from internal control weakness reports. Journal of Accounting Research 49 
(1): 97-136.  
Cziraki, P., and M. Groen-Xu. 2015. CEO Career concerns and risk taking. Working Paper, University of 
Toronto and London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).  
Datta, S., M. Iskandar-Datta, and K. Raman. 2005. Managerial stock ownership and the maturity structure 
of corporate debt. Journal of Finance 60 (5): 2333-2350.  
Dechow, P., and R. Sloan. 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical 
investigation. Journal of accounting and Economics 14 (1): 51-89. 
Demerjian, P. R. 2011. Accounting standards and debt covenants: Has the “balance sheet approach” led to 
a decline in the use of balance sheet covenants? Journal of Accounting and Economics 52: 178-202.  
Doidge, C., G. A. Karolyi, and R. M. Stulz. 2004. Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more? 
Journal of Financial Economics 71: 205-238.  
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics 43 (2): 
153-193.  
Gillan, S. L., J. C. Hartzell, and R. Parrino. 2009. Explicit versus implicit contracts: Evidence from CEO 
employment agreement. Journal of Finance 64 (4): 1629-1655. 
Graham, J. R., S. Li, and J. Qiu. 2008. Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of 
Financial Economics 89: 44-61.  
Heckman, J. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47: 153-161. 
Hribar, P., and N. Yehuda. 2015. The mispricing of cash flows and accruals at different life‐cycle 
stages. Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (3): 1053-1072. 
Huang, P. 2011. Martial prenups? A look at CEO severance agreements. Working paper, Tulane 
University.  
Inderst, R., and H. M. Mueller. 2005. Keeping the board in the dark: CEO compensation and 
entrenchment. CEPR discussion paper No. 5315.  
Kim, J. B., B. Y. Song, and L. Zhang. 2011. Internal control weakness and bank loan contracting: 
Evidence from SOX Section 404 disclosures. The Accounting Review 86 (4): 1157-1188. 
Larcker, D. F., and T. O. Rusticus. 2010. On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 49: 186-205.  
Liao, S. 2015. Outside blockholders’ monitoring of management and debt financing. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 32 (4):1373-1404. 
Ortiz-Molina, H. 2006. Top-management incentives and the pricing of corporate public debt. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41 (2): 317-340.  
Pan, Y., T. Y. Wang, and M. S. Weisbach. 2015. Management risk and the cost of borrowing. Working 
paper, University of Utah, University of Minnesota, and Ohio State University.  
Rau, P. R., and J. Xu. 2013. How do ex-ante severance pay contracts fit into optimal incentive schemes? 
Journal of Accounting Research 51 (3): 631-671.  
Rusticus, T. O. 2006. Executive severance agreements. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.  
38 
 
Schwab, S. J., and R. S. Thomas. 2006. An empirical analysis of CEO employment contracts: What do 
top executives bargain for? Washington and Lee Law Review 63: 231-270. 
Smith, C., and J. Warner. 1979. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal of 
Financial Economics 7: 117-161. 
Sundaram, R. K., and D. Yermack. 2007. Pay me later: Inside debt and its role in managerial 
compensation. Journal of Finance 62 (4):1551-1588. 
Wei, C., and D. Yermack. 2011. Investor reactions to CEOs’ inside debt incentives. Review of Financial 
Studies 24 (11): 3813-3840. 
Xu, M. 2011. CEO contract horizon and investment. Working paper, London School of Economics.  
Xu, M. 2013. The costs and benefits of long-term CEO contracts. Working paper, London School of 
Economics.  
Yermack, D. 2006. Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 41: 237-256. 
  
39 
 
Appendix A 
Variable measurements 
 
Loan contract variables 
   
Financial Covenantsi,t = the number of financial covenants; 
Performance 
Covenantsi,t 
= the number of performance covenants, defined according to Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2012), which include (i) cash interest coverage ratio, (ii) debt 
service coverage ratio, (iii) level of EBITDA, (iv) fixed charge coverage 
ratio, (v) interest coverage ratio, (vi) ratio of debt to EBITDA, and (vii) ratio 
of senior debt to EBITDA; 
Capial Covenantsi,t = the difference between the number of financial covenants and performance 
covenants; 
Performance_Pricingi,t = 1 if the loan facility includes the performance pricing provision, and 0 
otherwise; 
Loan_Spreadi,t = natural logarithm of the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the 
LIBOR for the drawn portion of the loan facility; 
Loan Maturityi,t = natural logarithm of the loan maturity in months; 
Loan Amounti,t = natural logarithm of loan facility amount in millions; 
Secured_Loani,t = 1 if the loan facility is secured by collateral, and 0 otherwise; 
Secured_Missingi,t = 1 if the loan security information is not available from the Dealscan 
database, and 0 otherwise; 
Loan Type Fixed  
Effectsi,t 
= indicator variables for loan types, including term loan, revolver greater than 
1 year, revolver less than 1 year, and 364-day facility; 
Loan Purpose Fixed 
Effectsi,t 
= indicator variables for loan purposes, including corporate purposes, debt 
repayment, working capital, and takeover. 
   
CEO contractual protection  
   
CEO_Protectioni,t = the indicator variable for CEO contractual protection, which is equal to 1 if 
the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance pay 
agreement, and 0 otherwise;  
   
Firm characteristics and other variables 
   
Sizei,t-1 = natural logarithm of total assets in millions; 
Market-to-Booki,t-1 = sum of market value of equity and the book value of debt, scaled by total 
assets; 
Leveragei,t-1 = sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt, scaled by total assets; 
Return on Assetsi,t-1 = operating income before depreciation, scaled by total assets; 
Tangibility,t-1 = net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; 
Cash Flow Volatilityi,t-1 = standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations over the 4 fiscal 
years prior to the loan initiation year, scaled by sum of debt in current 
liabilities and long-term debt; 
Z-Scorei,t-1 = modified Altman’s z-score [1.2(Working capital) + 1.4(Retained earnings) + 
3.3(EBIT) + 0.999(Sales)], scaled by total assets. Following Graham et al. 
(2008), we do not include the ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of total debt, because a similar term, market-to-book, enters the regressions 
as a separate variable; 
∆GDPi,t  = percent change in GDP in the quarter of loan initiation relative to the same 
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  quarter one year ago; 
Time Trendi,t = linear time trend variable (t – 1995); 
CEO Equity 
Compensationi,t 
= CEOs’ equity-based compensation, calculated as the ratio of the value of 
CEOs’ stock and option grants to their total compensation in year t; 
CEO Equity 
Ownershipi,t 
= CEOs’ equity ownership, calculated as the total number of CEOs’ share and 
option holdings divided by the firm’s total number of shares outstanding; 
CEO Portfolio 
Sensitivityi,t 
= CEOs’ portfolio sensitivity to stock volatility, defined as the change in the 
value of the CEOs’ option portfolio due to a 1% increase in the annualized 
standard deviation of the firm’s stock return; 
Industry fixed effectsi,t = indicator variables for different industries, defined according to Fama and 
French (1997) industry classifications; 
i,t = loan i, year t subscripts.  
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection, composition, and descriptive statistics   
This table reports the sample selection, composition, and descriptive statistics for the sample of 6,470 
loans issued by the S&P 1500 firms with proxy statements from EDGAR in the 1995-2008 period.  
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
  Sample size 
   
Firm-years with proxy statements available from EDGAR for S&P 1500 
firms in the 1995-2008 period  18,936 
   
Less:   
   
Firm-years without loan information from DealScan 12,643  
   
Firm-years of financial firms 735  
   
Firm-years without Compustat data to calculate the regression variables 1,385  
   
Firm-years with required data  4,173 
Number of loans issued by the sample firms  6,470 
 
Panel B: Yearly distribution  
     Type of CEO protection 
 
 
Year 
# of 
loans 
 
(A) 
# of loans issued 
by firms with 
CEO protection 
(B) 
Percentage 
 
 
(B)/(A) 
 # of loans issued 
by firms with 
employment 
agreements 
# of loans issued by 
firms with 
standalone severance 
pay agreements 
1995 217 136 62.7%  65 71 
1996 284 173 60.9%  99 74 
1997 373 251 67.3%  144 107 
1998 364 235 64.6%  142 93 
1999 417 292 70.0%  192 100 
2000 487 358 73.5%  222 136 
2001 613 478 78.0%  298 180 
2002 591 475 80.4%  274 201 
2003 621 505 81.3%  326 179 
2004 647 525 81.1%  310 215 
2005 625 503 80.5%  321 182 
2006 489 412 84.3%  249 163 
2007 482 416 86.3%  231 185 
2008 260 226 86.9%  118 108 
       
Total 6,470 4,985 77.0%  2,991 1,994 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics: Full sample and separately for loans of firms with and without CEO protection 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics on loan contract terms and firm characteristics for our sample of 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms in 
the 1995-2008 period, and then separately for loans issued by firms with and those without CEO contractual protection. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics on loan contract terms. Panel B reports descriptive statistics on firm characteristics for the sample firms that issued these 
loans. Please see Appendix A for variable measurement. *, ** denote a significant difference in the mean/median for loans of firms with and 
without CEO protection at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 Full Sample 
 
(N=6,470) 
Loans issued by firms 
with CEO protection 
(N=4,985) 
Loans issued by firms 
without CEO protection 
(N=1,485) 
 Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. 
Panel A: Loan contract terms          
Number of Financial Covenants 1.50 2.00 1.36 1.55 2.00 1.34 1.33** 1.00** 1.41 
Performance Covenants 1.04 1.00 1.10 1.09 1.00 1.10 0.87** 0.00** 1.08 
Capital Covenants 0.46 0.00 0.69 0.46 0.00 0.67 0.46 0.00 0.75 
Performance_Pricing  0.56 1.00 0.50 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.51** 1.00** 0.50 
Loan spread (basis points) 123.54 87.50 105.80 129.91 100.00 108.01 102.13** 65.00** 94.95 
Log(spread) (Loan_Spread) 4.44 4.47 0.90 4.52 4.61 0.87 4.20** 4.17** 0.94 
Loan maturity (months) 43.16 50.00 24.08 43.40 52.00 23.38 42.35 48.00 26.29 
Log(maturity) (Loan Maturity) 3.54 3.91 0.76 3.55 3.95 0.75 3.49** 3.87 0.78 
Loan amount ($million) 484.31 250.00 657.11 460.26 250.00 623.95 565.02** 275.00** 752.55 
Log(loan amount) (Loan Amount) 5.48 5.52 1.26 5.46 5.52 1.23 5.56** 5.62** 1.35 
Secured_Loan  0.33 0.00 0.47 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.27** 0.00** 0.44 
Secured_Missing 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.46** 0.00** 0.50 
          
Panel B: Firm characteristics           
Total assets ($million) 7544 2210 15650 6736 2112 13617 10258** 2548** 20867 
Log of total assets (Size) 7.80 7.70 1.51 7.74 7.66 1.47 7.99** 7.84** 1.64 
Market-to-Book  1.87 1.56 0.96 1.81 1.51 0.93 2.07** 1.73** 1.04 
Leverage 0.28 0.27 0.16 0.29 0.28 0.16 0.27** 0.26** 0.16 
Return on Assets 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.16** 0.16** 0.07 
Tangibility 0.34 0.29 0.21 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.34 0.31** 0.20 
Cash Flow Volatility 1.50 0.19 5.67 1.46 0.18 5.63 1.64 0.21** 5.82 
Z-score 1.94 1.88 1.08 1.87 1.80 1.08 2.18** 2.11** 1.06 
CEO Equity Compensation 0.45 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.47 0.28 0.44 0.45 0.31 
CEO Equity Ownership 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04** 0.01** 0.06 
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity 4.22 4.35 1.58 4.24 4.35 1.50 4.15 4.32 1.82 
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TABLE 3 
CEO contractual protection and financial covenants of loan contracts 
 
This table reports results from the following Poisson regression of the number of covenants: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 , 
 
where Covenants is the total number of covenants and is measured in three alternative ways: the total number of financial covenants in Panel A, 
the number of performance covenants in Panel B, and the number of capital covenants in Panel C. See Appendix A for the measurement of other 
variables. In Column (1) of each panel, we report the Poisson regression of the above equation. In Column (2) of each panel, we replace 
CEO_Protection with the predicted value estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model and report the Poisson regression results. In 
Column (3) of each panel, we add to the Poisson regression model the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model. 
The sample includes 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The sample size is smaller for columns (2) and (3) due to 
the additional data requirement for the estimation of the CEO_Protection determinant model. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted 
for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel A: Analysis of financial covenants 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value 
of CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.070 0.043   0.083 0.091   0.096 0.069  
Size  -0.296 0.000   -0.310 0.000   -0.308 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.119 0.000   -0.122 0.000   -0.121 0.000  
Leverage  0.451 0.000   0.424 0.002   0.425 0.002  
Return on Assets  0.405 0.212   0.328 0.374   0.324 0.381  
Tangibility  -0.096 0.392   -0.112 0.404   -0.104 0.435  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.003 0.253   0.003 0.363   0.003 0.340  
Z-score  -0.013 0.581   -0.016 0.536   -0.015 0.558  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.063 0.231   -0.047 0.419   -0.046 0.428  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.711 0.015   0.658 0.084   0.736 0.051  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.015 0.219   0.017 0.233   0.016 0.267  
Loan Maturity  -0.044 0.186   -0.066 0.091   -0.065 0.093  
Loan Amount  0.124 0.000   0.142 0.000   0.141 0.000  
∆GDP  1.337 0.198   0.901 0.425   0.940 0.406  
Time Trend  0.012 0.020   0.009 0.180   0.009 0.188  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.026 0.509  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
 
N  6,470    5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2  0.124    0.122    0.122   
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Analysis of performance covenants 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value 
of CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.092 0.041   0.155 0.030   0.169 0.024  
Size  -0.334 0.000   -0.349 0.000   -0.348 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.114 0.000   -0.105 0.003   -0.104 0.003  
Leverage  0.785 0.000   0.808 0.000   0.808 0.000  
Return on Assets  0.609 0.149   0.341 0.482   0.339 0.486  
Tangibility  -0.379 0.008   -0.467 0.007   -0.458 0.008  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.055   0.005 0.139   0.005 0.125  
Z-score  -0.044 0.111   -0.021 0.494   -0.020 0.506  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.134 0.037   -0.115 0.120   -0.114 0.123  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.446 0.238   0.442 0.360   0.539 0.263  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.036 0.029   0.039 0.041   0.038 0.050  
Loan Maturity  0.080 0.036   0.057 0.194   0.057 0.192  
Loan Amount  0.135 0.000   0.146 0.000   0.145 0.000  
∆GDP  0.828 0.484   0.651 0.622   0.704 0.594  
Time Trend  0.044 0.000   0.040 0.000   0.040 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.060 0.264  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
 
N  6,470    5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2  0.155    0.156    0.156   
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel C: Analysis of capital covenants 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value 
of CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.045 0.270   -0.060 0.690   -0.043 0.639  
Size  -0.196 0.000   -0.197 0.000   -0.195 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.138 0.001   -0.166 0.001   -0.164 0.001  
Leverage  -0.525 0.029   -0.643 0.019   -0.638 0.020  
Return on Assets  -0.302 0.592   -0.018 0.977   -0.026 0.967  
Tangibility  0.644 0.004   0.727 0.004   0.737 0.004  
Cash Flow Volatility  -0.004 0.326   -0.004 0.463   -0.004 0.477  
Z-score  0.073 0.100   0.015 0.776   0.017 0.750  
CEO Equity Compensation  0.107 0.215   0.103 0.283   0.104 0.274  
CEO Equity Ownership  1.220 0.037   1.174 0.065   1.262 0.048  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   -0.017 0.500   -0.017 0.535   -0.018 0.501  
Loan Maturity  -0.323 0.000   -0.351 0.000   -0.350 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.083 0.005   0.112 0.001   0.112 0.001  
∆GDP  2.889 0.082   1.846 0.300   1.882 0.291  
Time Trend  -0.065 0.000   -0.065 0.000   -0.065 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio          0.057 0.469  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
 
N  6,470    5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2  0.103    0.099    0.099   
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TABLE 4 
CEO contractual protection and performance pricing provisions in loan contracts 
 
This table reports results from the following Logit regression of the likelihood of including the performance pricing provisions in loan contracts 
(Performance_Pricing): 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,  
 
where Performance_Pricing is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan contract includes the performance pricing provision, and 0 otherwise. 
See Appendix A for the measurement of other variables. In Column (1), we report the Logit regression of the above equation. In Column (2), we 
replace CEO_Protection with its predicted value estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model and report the Logit regression results. In 
Column (3), we add to the Logit regression model the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model. The sample 
includes 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The sample size is smaller for columns (2) and (3) due to the additional 
data requirement for the estimation of the CEO_Protection determinant model. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm 
clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value of 
CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.236 0.016   0.527 0.001   0.559 0.001  
Size  -0.414 0.000   -0.397 0.000   -0.393 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.197 0.002   -0.193 0.005   -0.186 0.006  
Leverage  0.031 0.931   0.002 0.997   0.015 0.970  
Return on Assets  1.372 0.142   1.561 0.120   1.520 0.130  
Tangibility  0.219 0.513   -0.159 0.667   -0.128 0.730  
Cash Flow Volatility  -0.005 0.455   -0.005 0.524   -0.005 0.536  
Z-score  0.074 0.258   0.053 0.483   0.057 0.449  
CEO Equity Compensation  0.029 0.836   0.132 0.389   0.136 0.378  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.415 0.691   1.771 0.144   2.016 0.102  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.016 0.654   0.003 0.948   -0.001 0.989  
Loan Maturity  0.187 0.036   0.176 0.078   0.178 0.075  
Loan Amount  0.432 0.000   0.436 0.000   0.436 0.000  
∆GDP  -3.666 0.144   -2.267 0.389   -2.168 0.410  
Time Trend  0.026 0.061   0.028 0.085   0.027 0.090  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.234 0.046  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
 
N  6,470    5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2  0.145    0.152    0.152   
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TABLE 5 
CEO contractual protection and loan spread 
 
This table reports results from the following OLS regression of loan spread (Loan_Spread): 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,  
 
where Loan_Spread is the natural logarithm of loan spread, which is the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn 
portion of the loan facility. See Appendix A for the measurement of other variables. For the loan-specific control variables, in additional to loan 
maturity and loan amount, we add four more variables: the total number of all covenants (Number of Covenants), an indicator for performance 
pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing), an indicator for secured loans (Secured_Loan), and an indicator for loans without loan security 
information (Secured_Missing). In Column (1), we report the OLS regression results of the above equation. In Column (2), we replace 
CEO_Protection with its predicted value estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model and report the OLS regression results. In Column 
(3), we add to the OLS regression model the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model. The sample includes 
6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The sample size is smaller for columns (2) and (3) due to the additional data 
requirement for the estimation of the CEO_Protection determinant model. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. 
The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 5 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value of 
CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.078 0.005   0.099 0.013   0.115 0.005  
Size  -0.118 0.000   -0.113 0.000   -0.112 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.099 0.000   -0.106 0.000   -0.103 0.000  
Leverage  0.808 0.000   0.784 0.000   0.788 0.000  
Return on Assets  -1.152 0.000   -1.052 0.000   -1.066 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.084 0.346   -0.087 0.371   -0.075 0.443  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.003 0.122   0.002 0.282   0.003 0.261  
Z-score  -0.070 0.000   -0.088 0.000   -0.086 0.000  
CEO Equity Compensation  0.069 0.055   0.051 0.180   0.053 0.168  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.904 0.000   0.981 0.000   1.082 0.000  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   -0.001 0.903   0.001 0.950   -0.001 0.942  
Loan Maturity  -0.097 0.000   -0.101 0.000   -0.101 0.000  
Loan Amount  -0.132 0.000   -0.141 0.000   -0.141 0.000  
Number of Covenants  -0.084 0.000   -0.087 0.001   -0.088 0.000  
Performance_Pricing  0.084 0.000   0.094 0.000   0.094 0.000  
Secured_Loan  0.524 0.000   0.523 0.000   0.524 0.000  
Secured_Missing  0.096 0.000   0.084 0.001   0.086 0.000  
∆GDP  -3.864 0.000   -4.008 0.000   -3.975 0.000  
Time Trend  0.025 0.000   0.024 0.000   0.024 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.030 0.330  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  6,470    5,388    5,388   
Adj. R2  0.675    0.685    0.517   
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TABLE 6 
CEO contractual protection and debt contracts –  
The incremental effect of the monetary strength of CEO Protection  
 
This table reports results from the following regression:  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 +
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,    
 
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan contract variables: (1) the number of performance covenants (Performance 
Covenants); (2) an indicator for the loan contracts that include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing); and (3) the natural 
logarithm of loan spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured as the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion 
of the loan facility. The Poisson regression, Logit regression, and OLS regression methods are used for the three dependent variables, respectively. 
Strength is an ordinal variable for the strength of CEO contractual protection; it equals 2 (1, 0) if the severance pay multiple—how many times the 
severance pay is relative to the base salary—is above three (between two and three, below two). CEO_Protection and Strength are set as zero for 
CEOs without contractual protection. Firm-years with CEO contractual protection but not the information on severance pay are excluded from the 
analyses. See Appendix A for the measurement of other variables. We add to the regressions the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the 
CEO_Protection determinant model to control for the endogeneity of CEO contractual protection. The p-values are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm clustering. The sample includes 5,267 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms that have detailed information on the strength of the CEO 
protection over the 1995-2008 period. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and CEO_Protection × Strength, and two-sided otherwise.  
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TABLE 6 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.105 0.135   0.313 0.054   0.057 0.135  
CEO_Protection × Strength  0.048 0.051   0.178 0.004   0.038 0.014  
Size  -0.351 0.000   -0.416 0.000   -0.112 <.0001  
Market-to-Book  -0.101 0.005   -0.185 0.008   -0.103 <.0001  
Leverage  0.823 0.000   -0.067 0.867   0.773 <.0001  
Return on Assets  0.293 0.565   1.148 0.259   -1.050 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.473 0.007   -0.106 0.777   -0.082 0.406  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.113   -0.006 0.464   0.002 0.275  
Z-score  -0.023 0.468   0.053 0.495   -0.086 <.0001  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.108 0.154   0.147 0.348   0.056 0.158  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.563 0.255   2.052 0.100   1.060 <.0001  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.033 0.100   0.005 0.900   -0.003 0.796  
Loan Maturity  0.047 0.283   0.172 0.091   -0.099 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.144 0.000   0.441 0.000   -0.142 <.0001  
Number of Covenants          -0.084 0.001  
Performance_Pricing          0.093 <.0001  
Secured_Loan          0.539 <.0001  
Secured_Missing          0.093 0.000  
∆GDP  0.789 0.556   -3.434 0.200   -3.938 <.0001  
Time Trend  0.040 0.000   0.025 0.132   0.023 <.0001  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.062 0.253   -0.237 0.044   -0.027 0.384  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  5,267    5,267    5,267   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.158    0.156    0.685   
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TABLE 7 
CEO contractual protection and debt contracts –  
Cross-sectional analyses – CEO age and tenure 
 
This table reports results from the following regression:  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 , 
     
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan contract variables: (1) the number of performance covenants (Performance 
Covenants); (2) an indicator for the loan contracts that include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing); and (3) the natural 
logarithm of loan spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured as the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion 
of the loan facility. The Poisson regression, Logit regression, and OLS regression methods are used for the three dependent variables, respectively. 
Conditional_Var is Old_CEO in Panel A and Long_Tenure in Panel B. Old_CEO equals 1 if the CEO’s age is 64 or higher, and 0 otherwise. 
Long_Tenure equals 1 if the CEO’s tenure is four years or more, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for the measurement of other variables. We add 
to the regressions the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model to control for the endogeneity of CEO contractual 
protection. The sample includes 5,388 (5,329) loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008 in Panel A (B). The p-values are based 
on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and the interaction term, and two-sided otherwise.  
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d) 
Panel A: Cross-sectional analysis – CEO age 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.196 0.016   0.534 0.001   0.143 0.001  
CEO_Protection × Old_CEO  -0.347 0.013   0.223 0.239   -0.167 0.039  
Old_CEO  0.072 0.532   -0.099 0.681   0.152 0.039  
Size  -0.346 0.000   -0.394 0.000   -0.112 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.103 0.003   -0.187 0.006   -0.103 0.000  
Leverage  0.801 0.000   0.018 0.964   0.781 0.000  
Return on Assets  0.332 0.493   1.519 0.132   -1.045 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.449 0.010   -0.142 0.703   -0.066 0.503  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.127   -0.005 0.537   0.003 0.257  
Z-score  -0.019 0.544   0.056 0.457   -0.087 0.000  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.119 0.105   0.135 0.382   0.057 0.141  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.518 0.290   2.075 0.090   0.976 0.000  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.039 0.047   -0.001 0.976   0.000 0.984  
Loan Maturity  0.058 0.187   0.178 0.075   -0.102 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.143 0.000   0.437 0.000   -0.141 0.000  
Number of Covenants          -0.086 0.001  
Performance_Pricing          0.094 0.000  
Secured_Loan          0.526 0.000  
Secured_Missing          0.088 0.000  
∆GDP  0.799 0.543   -2.236 0.396   -3.945 0.000  
Time Trend  0.039 0.000   0.027 0.089   0.024 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.057 0.288   -0.235 0.046   -0.032 0.295  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  5,388    5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.157    0.153    0.686   
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Cross-sectional analysis –CEO tenure 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.269 0.004   0.767 0.000   0.116 0.016  
CEO_Protection × Long_Tenure  -0.405 0.000   -0.403 0.026   -0.078 0.087  
Long_Tenure  0.014 0.873   0.229 0.211   -0.062 0.214  
Size  -0.341 0.000   -0.389 0.000   -0.116 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.095 0.004   -0.188 0.006   -0.105 0.000  
Leverage  0.759 0.000   0.000 0.999   0.789 0.000  
Return on Assets  0.346 0.443   1.473 0.145   -1.055 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.487 0.005   -0.129 0.729   -0.075 0.441  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.142   -0.005 0.508   0.002 0.385  
Z-score  -0.011 0.712   0.064 0.402   -0.085 0.000  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.126 0.074   0.142 0.365   0.033 0.390  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.601 0.199   1.873 0.142   1.196 0.000  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.052 0.011   0.009 0.815   0.006 0.583  
Loan Maturity  0.064 0.127   0.177 0.080   -0.099 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.147 0.000   0.435 0.000   -0.142 0.000  
Number of Covenants          -0.082 0.001  
Performance_Pricing          0.085 0.000  
Secured_Loan          0.495 0.000  
Secured_Missing          0.082 0.001  
∆GDP  0.840 0.506   -2.098 0.428   -3.889 0.000  
Time Trend  0.040 0.000   0.026 0.110   0.024 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.033 0.556   -0.232 0.051   -0.017 0.589  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  5,329    5,329    5,329   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.164    0.153    0.691   
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TABLE 8 
CEO contractual protection and debt contracts – Firm life-cycle stage 
 
This table reports results from the following regression:  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,  
         
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan contract variables: (1) the number of performance covenants (Performance 
Covenants); (2) an indicator for the loan contracts that include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing); and (3) the natural 
logarithm of loan spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured as the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion 
of the loan facility. The Poisson regression, Logit regression, and OLS regression methods are used for the three dependent variables, respectively. 
Growth_Stage equals 1 if the firm-year is in the growth life-cycle stage, and 0 otherwise. Following Hribar and Yehuda (2015), we create a life-
cycle-stage score by summing the standardized values of (1) sales growth, (2) capital expenditures, (3) net-capital transactions, and (4) (inverse 
ranking of) firm age. Firm-years ranked in the top quintile based on this summary score are classified into the growth life-cycle stage. See 
Appendix A for the measurement of other variables. We add to the regressions the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the CEO_Protection 
determinant model to control for the endogeneity of CEO contractual protection. The sample includes 5,340 loans issued S&P 1500 firms over the 
period 1995-2008. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and the 
interaction term, and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 8 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  -0.056 0.320   0.134 0.299   0.041 0.256  
CEO_Protection × Growth_Stage  0.288 0.004   0.520 0.016   0.092 0.080  
Growth_Stage  -0.045 0.634   -0.320 0.122   -0.143 0.018  
Size  -0.355 0.000   -0.398 0.000   -0.106 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.097 0.006   -0.181 0.009   -0.107 0.000  
Leverage  0.784 0.000   -0.070 0.860   0.770 0.000  
Return on Assets  0.396 0.414   1.730 0.092   -1.060 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.467 0.008   -0.133 0.723   -0.068 0.492  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.121   -0.004 0.618   0.002 0.346  
Z-score  -0.024 0.450   0.041 0.598   -0.083 0.000  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.124 0.091   0.113 0.465   0.048 0.212  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.567 0.236   1.680 0.183   0.962 0.000  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.038 0.053   0.001 0.987   0.000 0.978  
Loan Maturity  0.055 0.207   0.179 0.074   -0.100 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.151 0.000   0.445 0.000   -0.140 0.000  
Number of Covenants          -0.092 0.000  
Performance_Pricing          0.095 0.000  
Secured_Loan          0.533 0.000  
Secured_Missing          0.088 0.000  
∆GDP  0.968 0.460   -1.879 0.478   -3.990 0.000  
Time Trend  0.039 0.000   0.030 0.068   0.024 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.053 0.321   -0.227 0.055   -0.021 0.487  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  5,340    5,340    5,340   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.160    0.156    0.687   
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TABLE 9 
CEO contractual protection and bond yield spread  
 
This table reports results from the following OLS regression of bond yield spread (Bond_Yield): 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑_𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,  
 
where Bond_Yield is measured as the offering yield of a bond minus the yield of treasures with similar maturity. See Appendix A for the 
measurement of other variables. In Column (1), we report the OLS regression results of the above equation. In Column (2), we replace 
CEO_Protection with its predicted value estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model and report the OLS regression results. In Column 
(3), we add to the OLS regression model the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model. The sample includes 
2,201 bonds issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The sample size is smaller for columns (2) and (3) due to the additional data 
requirement for the estimation of the CEO_Protection determinant model. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. 
The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise.  
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TABLE 9 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of 
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value of 
CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.206 0.053   0.336 0.027   0.369 0.018  
Size  0.124 0.048   0.144 0.033   0.149 0.030  
Market-to-Book  -0.333 0.000   -0.318 0.000   -0.315 0.000  
Leverage  2.856 0.000   2.622 0.000   2.641 0.000  
Return on Assets  -0.909 0.378   -0.897 0.395   -0.921 0.382  
Tangibility  0.940 0.031   0.972 0.024   0.973 0.024  
Cash Flow Volatility  -0.006 0.157   -0.008 0.097   -0.008 0.103  
Z-score  -0.028 0.798   -0.052 0.647   -0.049 0.670  
CEO Equity Compensation  0.155 0.441   0.075 0.722   0.067 0.753  
CEO Equity Ownership  -0.866 0.597   -0.382 0.865   -0.274 0.903  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   -0.084 0.058   -0.070 0.143   -0.073 0.126  
Loan Maturity  -0.465 0.000   -0.424 0.000   -0.425 0.000  
Loan Amount  -0.170 0.082   -0.219 0.037   -0.215 0.039  
∆GDP  -26.108 0.000   -24.932 0.000   -24.953 0.000  
Time Trend  0.009 0.593   0.008 0.612   0.007 0.670  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.134 0.238  
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  2,201    1,961    1,961   
Adj. R2  0.285    0.293    0.294   
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TABLE 10 
CEO contractual protection and debt contracts – A difference-in-differences approach for switch firms 
 
This table reports results from the following regression:  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛‐𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦‐𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,           
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan contract variables: (1) the number of performance covenants (Performance 
Covenants); (2) an indicator for the loan contracts that include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing); and (3) the natural 
logarithm of loan spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured as the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion 
of the loan facility. The Poisson regression, Logit regression, and OLS regression methods are used for the three dependent variables, respectively. 
Switchi is an indicator variable for firms that do not have employment agreements or severance pay agreements with their CEOs in the earlier part 
of the sample period, but have such agreements in the later part of the sample period. Postt is an indicator variable for the years when switch firms 
have employment or severance pay agreements with their CEOs. Control firms are those without employment or severance pay agreements with 
their CEOs throughout the sample period; Switchi and Postt are set as zero for these firms. See Appendix A for the measurement of other variables. 
We add to the regressions the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the CEO_Protection determinant model to control for the endogeneity of CEO 
contractual protection. The sample includes 2,036 loans issued S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The p-values are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for the interaction term, and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 10 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
  Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
Switch  0.081 0.459   0.117 0.633   0.091 0.128  
Switch × Post  0.174 0.092   0.502 0.048   0.142 0.024  
Size  -0.468 0.000   -0.491 0.000   -0.140 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.121 0.035   -0.244 0.020   -0.067 0.017  
Leverage  1.125 0.000   0.632 0.369   0.961 0.000  
Return on Assets  -0.041 0.958   2.934 0.095   -1.661 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.584 0.095   -1.346 0.057   0.055 0.746  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.007 0.221   -0.011 0.307   0.001 0.751  
Z-score  -0.006 0.913   0.176 0.225   -0.038 0.269  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.074 0.554   -0.208 0.471   0.012 0.855  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.104 0.880   1.802 0.319   0.902 0.012  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.069 0.032   0.043 0.489   0.036 0.020  
Loan Maturity  0.047 0.517   0.309 0.048   -0.094 0.040  
Loan Amount  0.220 0.000   0.375 0.000   -0.147 0.000  
Number of Covenants          -0.123 0.001  
Performance_Pricing          0.111 0.000  
Secured_Loan          0.462 0.000  
Secured_Missing          0.044 0.245  
∆GDP  -0.456 0.835   -5.038 0.233   -5.050 0.000  
Time Trend  0.044 0.001   0.040 0.173   0.011 0.093  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.133 0.093   -0.007 0.971   -0.039 0.362  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  2,036    2,036    2,036   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.202    0.200    0.718   
 
 
